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The number of seats currently apportioned to each nation in the 
European Parliament is far from the ideal of one-man, one-vote. It is 
likely to become even more so as populations shift and new nations join. 
As European rather than national interests become more dominant, 
pressure is likely to build for representation more closely tied to popula- 
tions. The merits of different approaches to meeting fair representation 
are evaluated and compared in terms of basic principles that underlie 
one-man, one-vote. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
FAIR REPlUisENTATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN PARLMWXT 
M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young 
1. Representation 
The 434 seats of the European ~arliarh'knt are currently apportioned 
among the ten member nations as follows: 81 to each of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France; 25 to the 
Netherlands; 24 to e'ach of Belgium and Greece; 16 to Denmark; 15 to Ire- 
land; and 6 to Luxembourg. Their proportional shares, on the other hand, 
are: 99.69, 91.03, 90.57, 85.71 for the "big four"; 22.32 for the Nether- 
lands; 15.91 and 14.86 for Belgium and Greece; 8.22 for Denmark; 5.12 for 
Ireland; and 0.58 for Luxembourg. Why then was this apportionment 
chosen? 
Throughout the building of the European Community the number of 
delegates allotted to each of the member states have been the result of 
political negotiation and compromise. Delegations were thought of as 
blocs standmg together to represent national interests. This view still 
prevailed when, in 1976, the decision was made to expand the Assembly 
from 198 to 410 members, elected by direct universal suffrage. This deci- 
sion has profound implications for the nature of representation in the 
Parliament. 
How many seats to give each nation in the reformed Assembly was a 
hotly contested issue. A resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1975 
enunciated three criteria to govern the allocation of seats.' The first and 
most significant of these is a widely shared concept of fair representa- 
tion: "the hqhest degree of proportionality should be achieved between 
the number of inhabitants of a State and the number of its representa- 
tives in the European Parliament". Together with this basic proportional- 
ity principle came two more conditions: "all the important political 
forces of a State should be represented in the European Parliament", and 
"the new distribution of seats should not lead to a reduction in the 
present number of any State's representatives". In effect these criteria 
impose a minimum required number of representatives for each nation 
(the second of them alone implying that the first must be satisfied). 
These numbers were: 36 each to the FRG, Italy, U.K., and France, 14 each 
to the Netherlands and Belgium, 10 each to Denmark and Ireland, and 6 
to Luxembourg, for a total of 198. 
The resolution also proposed a specific apportionment of 359 seats 
that amply satisfied the minimum requirements, but badly failed to meet 
the criterion of proportionality. Many competing proposals were 
advanced, and a deadlock developed. To resolve the deadlock, the French 
proposed that the status p o  be maintained; simultaneously the Belgians 
put forward a plan that would add to the allocation of 198 seats that then 
existed 198 more apportioned according to populations. The final solu- 
tion, based on the suggestion of the FRG to simply double the existing dis- 
tribution, essentially satisfied the s t a b  quo  position while admitting 
several delicate adjustments. Apparently, 72 (twice 36) did not suffice for 
the U.K. to allot seats internally among England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland: the U.K. felt it needed 81. So the big four each got 81. 
In view of the populations, 28 was too much for Belgium and the Nether- 
lands, 20 too much for Denmark and Ireland, and 12 too much for Luxem- 
bourg. 28 became 25; 20 became 15; and 12 became 6. But the Danes 
had instructions not to accept less than 16, and the Belgians, for internal 
reasons, preferred ai i  even number, so Belgium ceded one seat to Den- 
mark. The fact is that after much debate the members found it more 
expedient to adopt a compromise solution than no solution at  all. 
To students of the history of the United States the problem has a 
familiar ring. A considerable investment of time and thought was given to 
the apportionment of seats among the states a t  the Constitutional Con- 
vention in Philadelphia in 1787. The dominant philosophical ideal of the 
time was, as James Madison stated it, that the states "ought to  vote in the 
same proportion in which their citizens would do if the people of all the 
states were collectively met", yet this was checked by the fear of the 
small states "solicitous to guard ... against an improper consolidation" of 
the larger  state^.^ From this emerged a House apportioned among the 
states according to  their populations but guaranteeing each a t  least one 
seat no matter how small, and a Senate with each state accorded two 
seats whatever its size. This concession of the larger to the smaller 
states (known as the Great Compromise) was necessary to  create a 
federation of previously sovereign states. Very quickly, however, elected 
officials ceased to think of themselves as  narrow sectional representa- 
tives of separate states, formed national political parties that tran- 
scended state boundaries, and came to represent people belonging to 
one, larg er community. 
The same development can already be discerned in the European 
Parliament. Trans-national parties have formed. Members of Parliament 
no longer vote in national blocs; instead of representing purely national 
interests they represent peqple in one larger European Community. 
This new situation means, however, that representatives ought prop- 
erly to represent equal numbers of constituents no matter in what nation 
they happen to reside. The present allocation is grossly distorted from 
this standpoint. For example, one representative of the F.R.G.stands for 
759,420 people, whereas one representative of recently admitted Greece 
stands for 381,958 people: the voice of a Greek in electing a member of 
Parliament is wwth two times that of a German. The large discrepancies 
in the representation of people in different nations may be seen by com- 
paring their average constituency sizes (see Table 1). The more the Com- 
munity unifies the less will its inhabitants be willing to accept such differ- 
ences. The American experience confirms this: the Constitutional 
requirement to reapportion the House on the basis of a new census every 
ten years regularly provoked intense debates on the fairness of alterna- 
tive proposals. Although clearly politically motivated, the discussion 
tended to center on two major issues: the proper choice of method of 
apportionment and the total number of seats to be distributed. These 
debates were fueled by constant shifts in the relative populations of the 
states and the admission of new states into the Union. 
No. people 
Population Representatives per Repr. 
(000's) 
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total 267,803 434 817,058 
Table 1. Number of people per representative (1976 populations) 
The ad hoc character of the 1976 solution will undoubtedly provoke a 
parallel European experience. How many seats should be allotted to a 
new entrant? The one case so far is Greece, which received 24 seats - 
apparently because, while it was much smaller than the Netherlands and 
therefore deserved less than 25, it could be reasonably bracketed with 
Belgium and therefore get 24. Thus does one ad hoc solution beget 
another. And there will almost certainly be still more new entrants in the 
years to come, such as Portugal or Spain. 
Shifting populations are further eroding the legitimacy of the 
present apportionment. Projections suggest that between 1976 and 1985 
France's population will have increased by some 2 million and Germany's 
decreased by about the same amount. Such shifts should entail periodic 
reapportionments to maintain a fair balance among the voices of the peo- 
ple no matter where they happen to reside in the Community. 
In short, much as in the stripling United States two hundred years 
ago, the natural force of events is likely to lead to a demand for represen- 
t a t i o n  i n  t h e  Parliament more propor t ional  t o  p o ~ u l a t i o n s ,  and t o  
t h e  choice of a d e f i n i t e  method o r  formula i n  advance t h a t  meets 
ob jec t ive  c r i t e r i a  of  f a i r n e s s .  
The goal of this paper is, first, to define the ideal of proportionality 
and to explain the difficulties in meeting it precisely; next, to describe 
several historically important methods and how they would work under 
different assumptions about changes in populations and membership in 
the Commusity. This leads to a consideration of the fundamental fairness 
prhci.ples by which the merits of different methods can be evaluated. 
The conclusion is that there is exactly one method that is appropriate for 
future use in allocating seats in the ~ar l ia~~lent . '  
2. The Ideal Shares 
Ideally, every delegate to the European Parliament should iepresent 
the same number of constituents. But the ideal cannot be met. Allocat- 
ing seats precisely in proportion to populations is impossible because 
representatives are by nature indivisible: they do not come in half- or 
quarter-sizes. Further the practical provision for minimum numbers of 
representatives, designed to protect the interests of the smaller states, 
forces a modification in the ideal. 
The ideal number of constituents per representative or canstit2Lmcy 
size is found by dividing the total population by the total number of seats. 
For the 1976 populations this gives an ideal constituency size of 617,058. 
A state's pure quota is its population divided by the constituency size. 
The pure quotas of the ten member states of the European Parliament 
are shown in Table 2. st , 
Country Population Pure Quota Minimum . Quota 
(000's) 
F.R.G. - 
Italy 
U.K 
France 
Netherlarids 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total 287,80 3 434 212 434 
Table 2. Quotas for the European Parliament (1976 populations4) 
When minimum requirements are imposed, the concept of pure 
quota must be modified. The reason is evident from Table 2: if Denmark, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg got their minimum rquirements (10, 10, and 6 
respectively) not enough seats would remain for the others to get even 
the whole numbers contained in their pure quotas. (Their sum is 416, 
which added to the 26 required for the smallest three gives a total of 
442. ) 
To find the fair shares of the states in the presence of minimum 
requirements, first compute the shares without requirements using the 
ideal constituency size, then reduce them in the same proportion by 
increasing the constituency size until the larger of the reduced shares or 
requirements, summed over all states, equals the number of seats to be 
apportioned. The p o t a  of a state is its reduced share or requirement, 
whichever is larger. Table 2 shows the quotas for the European Parlia- 
ment obtained by increasing the constituency size. from 617,058 'to 
635,324. The quotas of Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg are the same 
as their minimum reuirements and the shares of the remaining states are 
reduced proportionally so that they sum up to the remaining 408 seats. 
As the quotas are not whole numbers they must be rounded in some 
fashion. Ordinary rounding, in which fractions below .5 are dropped and 
those above .5 are rounded up, does not work because it may not result in 
the required number of seats. In Table 2, for example, ordinary rounding 
would yield 433 seats instead of the required 434. Therefore, some state 
having a fraction less than .5 must be rounded up. Which should it be? 
3. Methods and Principles 
The three best known and most used methods of apportionment have 
many aliases in both name and description. 
The method of greatest  r e m a i n d e n  was first formulated by 
Alexander Hamilton5 in 1792. One begins by giving to each nation the 
whole number contained in its quota. The seats left over are assigned to 
those states having the largest fractional remainders. For the example of 
Table 3 the first process allots 430 seats and the remaining 4 are given 
one each to the U.K., the F.R.G., the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The greatest remainders method obeys the quota principle : that is, 
no state gets more than its quota rounded up -its u . m  quota - nor less 
than its quota rounded down - its lower p o t a .  Thus Italy, with quota 
88.408, gets either 88 or 89 seat, but not  87 or 90. 
In any specific problem, some states will necessarily get more than 
their quotas and others less. For example, the greatest remainders 
method gives the FRG 97 seats when its fair share is 96.822 whereas 
France gets 83 seats with fair share 83.250. Thus this solution favors the 
FRG over France. But over many problems, an apportionment method 
should on average, give each state, whatever its size, its fair share. This 
is the pr indp l e  of being unbiased.  
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
With Greece Without Greece 
Population Quota Greatest Quota Greatest 
Remainders Remainders 
Minima (000's) Apportionment Apportionment 
Total 267,803 434 434 420 420 
Table 3, Greatest remainders apportionments with and without Greece 
-- showing violation of the independence. principle (1976 popu- 
lations) 
The method of greatest remainders is unbiased. This is because the 
sizes of the remainders, which determine the states that get extra seats, 
are independent of the size of the states themselves. Thus, the chance 
that a state gets an extra seat is the same whatever its size. 
The basic data of apportionment change over time. The populations 
of the states shift relative to one another, new states may join, others 
may drop out, and with these may come changes in the total number of 
Parliamentary seats. A method must be robust in the face of such 
changes. 
If a state drops out (or joins) no transfer of seats among the remain- 
ing states should be necessary. This is the independence principle. The 
greatest remainders metho& violates this principle. Table 3 shows that 
with Greece in the Community, Italy would receive 88 seats and Belgium 
16, whereas if Greece were to drop out with its 14 seats, then the method 
would force Belgium to give up one seat to Italy. 
The greatest remainders method also violates the population princi- 
ple. Suppose it were discovered that the populations of the FRG and the 
U.K had both been over-counted by 200,000 persons, Italy over-counted 
by 10,000, and Belgium under-counted by 10,000. This gives the popula- 
tions of Table 4 .  The apportionment differs only in that Italy, a state that 
loses population, gains m e  seat ,  whereas Belgium, a state that gains 
pupuLation, loses one seat .  
This same example shows that the method of greatest remainders 
violates the size principle. For when 434 seats are allocated among the 
nations Belgium receives 15 seats, whereas if only 432 seats are to be 
shared Belgium's assignment jumps up to 16. Outcomes such as these 
that do not accord with changes in the data. are not robust. 
Population Quota Greatest 
Remainders 
Minima (000's) Apportionment 
F.R.G. 36 61,313 96.656 97 
Italy 3 6 56,158 88.529 89 
U.K. 36 55,685 87.784 88 
France 36 52,891 83.379 8 3 
Netherlands 14 13,770 21.707 2 2 
Belgium 14 8,828 15.493 15 
Greece 14 8,167 14.451 14 
Denmark 10 5,073 10 10 
Ireland 10 3,162 10 10 
Luxembourg 6 356 6 6 
Quota Greatest 
Remainders 
Apportionment 
96.182 96 
88.095 88 
87.353 87 
82.970 83 
21.601 22 
15.417 16 
14.380 14 
10 10 
10 10 
6 6 
Total 267,403 434 434 k32 432 
Table 4. Greatest remainders apportionments for slightly modified 1876 
populations -- showing violation of population and size 
principles 
These violations of principle come about because this approach uses 
re7?aainde~s to determine the priority for "extra" seats rather than the 
relat ive  s i zes  of the states. The remainders of large states change more 
rapidly in absolute amount than those of small states when the total 
number of seats to be apportioned changes, a state is added or dropped, 
or there are some small shifts in the population data. This can cause 
changes in priority for receiving extra seats which is not consistent with 
proportionality. 
- - 
The method commonly called d 'Hondt 's6 (also known as Hagenbach- 
Bischoff's, highest averages and greatest divisors) was actually first pro- 
cl posed by Thomas Jefferson in 1792. Begin by computing the fair shares 
or quotas using the ideal constituency size. Then increase all the shares 
in the same proportion by reducing the constituency size until the whole 
numbers contained in the increased shares (or the minimum require- 
ments, whichever is larger) summed over all states, equals the total 
number to be apportioned. 
The largest constituency size (or "common divisor") for which the 
correct sum is obtained is the d'Hondt divisor (in this case 629,654) and 
the associated shares (or minimum requirements, whichever is larger) 
are the d9Hondt n u m b e m .  For example, the U.K.'s d'Hondt number is 
88.755 so it receives 88 seats and France's is 84.0001 so it is assigned 84 
(see Table 5). 
D'Hondt's method assures each state at least its lower quota, 
because the d'Hondt numbers used to determine the apportionment are 
larger than the quotas. However, d'Hondtls method may not be maT 
quota,  in the following sense: taking one seat from France and transfer- 
ring it to the Netherlands would bring both closer to their quotas. More- 
over, although this example does not show it, the method can give to 
large states more seats than its upper quota,e so it does not necessarily 
obey the quota principle. 
dlHondt d'Hondt 
Minima Quota number a~wortionment 
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U. K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total - 434 - 434 
Table 5. D'Hondt apportionment (1976 populations) 
D'Hondtss method is strongly biased in favor of the larger states. 
This can be observed in practice: for example, France receives 84 seats 
when it deserves only 83.250 and the Netherlands 21 when it deserves 
21.674. This happens systematically because the dlHondt numbers of the 
larger states differ from the quotas by larger absolute amounts than 
those of the smaller states. For example, in Table 5 the F'RG's d'Hondt 
number is 0.871 larger than its quota, while Greece's is only 0.170 larger. 
So the chance that a state receives more seats than its lower quota is 
much greater for the big states than for the small. 
On the other hand, the method of d'Hondt satisfies the indepen- 
dence, population, and size principles. If a state and the number of seats 
it deserves is dropped (or vice versa) then the identical d'Hondt numbers * 
give the solution for the states that remain. If between two apportion- 
ments some state's population decreases but its representation 
increases, then its dlHondt number must also have increased; hence any 
state whose population increases cannot have a smaller dlHondt number 
and so it cannot have received fewer seats. Finally, if more seats are to 
be allocated then the deHondt numbers that change all increase, so no 
state can possibly lose a seat. 
The method of n a j w  fractions (known in some countries as Sainte- 
~ a ~ i i e ' s '  in others as odd numbers) was first proposed by Daniel 
websterio in 1832. Begin by computing the fair shares of all states using 
the ideal constituency size. Then change all the shares in the same pro- 
portion by altering the constituency size until the whole numbers closest 
to the altered shares (or minimum requirements, whichever are larger), 
summed over all states, equals the total number to be apportioned. 
The largest constituency size (or "common divisor") for which the 
correct sum is obtained is called the Webstw d i v i s o ~  (in this case 
634,666) and the associated shares (or minimum requirements, whichever 
are larger) are the Webster numbm. For example, Italy's Webster 
number is 88.5001 so it receives 89, Belgium's 14.470 so it receives 14 
(see Table 6). Sometimes the Webster numbers are greater than the 
quotas, sometimes smaller (e.g., for the apportionment of 434 seats of 
Table 4 they are smaller). 
The method of major fractions does not invariably stay within the 
quota: it is mathematically possible for a state either to receive more 
seats than its upper quota or less than its lower quota. But in practice 
the likelihood of this happening is nil. It always stays near the quota. It 
is also unbiased because the Webster numbers have the s m e  chance of 
being greater than the quotas as being smaller, and the chance that a 
state has a remainder -above or below .5 is the same regardless of its size. 
Finally, Webster's method satisfies the independence population, and size 
principles for exactly the same reasons that d'Hondtls does. 
Major 
Webster fractions 
Minimum Quota number apvortionment 
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total - 434 - 434 
Table 6. Major f'ractions apportionment ( 1976 populations) 
The case is summarized in Table 7. Not one of the three methods meets 
all principles. In fact there is n o  method that satisfies all the principles. 
However, the method of major tractions satisfies all of the principles 
except quota, and for all practical purposes it satisfies that one too. 
Moreover it is the only one among all possible methods that does so. 
Methods Greatest Major 
Principles remainders D'Hondt f'ractions 
quota Yes 
near quota Yes 
unbiased Yes 
population No 
independence No 
size No 
Table 7.  Methods meeting principles 
No Almost 
No Yes 
No Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
D'Hondt's is the one and only method that satisfies the population, 
membership and size principles and always assures each state its lower 
quota. However, it is very biased in favor of the larger states and h-e- 
quently gives large states seats in excess of their upper quotas.11 
The greatest remainders method is unbiased and always satisfies the 
quota principle, but it frequently violates the population, independence, 
and size principles. 
The conclusion seems inescapable that the method of major frac- 
tions comes closest to meeting the principles of one-man, one-vote. 
4. Implementation 
The European Parliament is only one of three policy making institu- 
tions of the Community, along with the Council of Ministers and the Com- 
mission. Its explicit powers are not extensive, although its potential influ- 
ence may be great. In the words of one authority, "Its task is primarily 
that of providing a democratic input into the Community decision making 
process and providing an on-going forum for debate on Community 
matters."12 
The historical evolution of representation in federal systems and the 
theory explained in the preceding sections lead to certain conclusions 
and recommendations concerning the future allocation of seats among 
the member nations of the European Parliament. The formation of par- 
ties across national boundaries will inevitably lead to greater integration 
and pressure for representation in proportion to populations. Sooner or 
later, as populations shift and new states enter the European Community, 
the existing allocation will lose any justification it may once have had. 
What are the requirements for a solution with more enduring legi- 
timacy? 
First, some provision must be made for a periodic census of popula- 
tions, for example every 5 or 10 years. Only thus can growing and chang- 
ing populations be reflected promptly and fairly by changes in represen- 
tation. Further, the numbers on which representation is based must be 
made consistent for all member states. Whether the basis should be the 
number of voters or the number of inhabitants, or should include over- 
seas citizens, noncitizens, illegal immigrants, or prisoners is a matter for 
the legislators to decide. 
Second, some definite method of apportionment must be established 
by law to prevent the inevitable scramble for seats that would otherwise 
result after each census. The choice in terms of satisfying the most prin- 
ciples of fairness is the method of major fractions. 
Third, there must be a definite and equitable procedure for assigning 
representation to new states. One approach is to determine the number 
of seats the entering state would deserve based on the estimate of its 
population at  the previous census date. The precise number assigned 
would depend of course on the method being used. Under the method of 
major fractions the largest common divisor used to find the previous 
apportionment would be applied to the new state as well. For example, if 
Portugal were to  enter the Community, then its 1976 population of 
9,864,000 would be divided by the 1976 Webster divisor of 634 666, result- 
ing in a Webster number of 15.227 and so an allocation of 15 seats and the 
other delegations would stay the same, since Webster's method satisfies 
the independence principle. 
Fourth, to protect the interests of the smallest states, equitable 
minima must be fixed in advance. The present minima originated in mak- 
ing sure that all the major forces of a state would be represented. For 
Luxembourg this originally meant a minimum oi 3 representatives but 
was later doubled to 6. The result is that the average citizen of Luxem- 
bourg has 12 times more representation than does a citizen of the FRG. 
While the choice of minima is ultimately up to the members of the Euro- 
pean Community, simple equity and common sense suggest that they 
should be reduced -- perhaps to one-half their present values, or perhaps 
to a uniform minimum of 1 per state - instead of increased as is past 
practice. 
I t  is essential, however, that the rninima be fixed. A politically 
tempting alternative is to legislate that no state can ever lose seats in a 
redistribution. This can yield one of two results, both deleterious: either 
the total number of seats increases without limit, resulting in a hope- 
lessly unwieldy body; or i f  the number of seats is fixed but no state can 
lose, then as populations shift proportional representation eventually 
ceases to exist. 
If the method of major fractions were adopted and Portugal admitted 
on the basis of its 1976 population, Portugal would receive 15 seats and 
the Parliament would grow to 449 seats. Reapportionments based on pro- 
jected 1985 populations under three different hypotheses of fixed minima 
- a uniform guarantee of 1 seat to each state, the "old" minima, and the 
"old" divided by 2 -- are given by way of illustration in Table 8. 
Maj. Maj. Maj. 
Population Quota frac. Quota frac. Quota frac. 
(000's) (Min 1) Appt. (Min o l d ~ 2 )  Appt. (Min old) Appt. 
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total 280,541 449 449 449 449 449 449 
Table 8. Major fractions apportionments (1985 projected populations13) 
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